|
The Blair & Bush War Memo |
|
The Bush-Blair 2003 Iraq memo or "Manning Memo" was a secret memo of a meeting between American President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair that took place on January 31, 2003. It purportedly showed that the Bush administration had already decided on the US invasion of Iraq at that point. The memo was written by Blair's chief foreign adviser at the time, David Manning, who participated at the meeting.
It has become controversial for its content, which shows Bush floating the idea of painting a U-2 spyplane in UN colors and letting it fly low over Iraq to provoke the then-leader Saddam Hussein to shoot it down, providing a pretext for America and Britain's subsequent invasion. It also shows George Bush and Tony Blair making a secret deal to carry out said invasion regardless of whether weapons of mass destruction were discovered by UN weapons inspectors, in direct contradiction with statements Blair made to Parliament afterwards that Saddam would be given a final chance to disarm. -[EDITED]-
Veterans for Common Sense Letter signed by 1,000 war veterans and given to the President on March 10, 2003.
".....The possibility of large-scale war between the U.S. and Iraq looms before us once again. For this urgent reason we would like to meet with you to discuss steps the United States and its allies can take to protect U.S. soldiers, allied forces, and Iraqi civilians from known and suspected hazards that would result from military operations. We understand the risks that come with war and that there are times when such risks are necessary. However, we strongly question the need for a war at this time. Despite Secretary of State Colin Powell's report to the Security Council and the testimony of others in the administration, we are not convinced that coercive containment has failed, or that war has become necessary. Our own intelligence agencies have consistently noted both the absence of an imminent threat from Iraq and reliable evidence of cooperation between Iraq and Al Qaeda. Again, we question whether this is the right time and the right war. Further, we believe the risks involved in going to war, under the unclear and shifting circumstances that confront us today, are far greater than those faced in 1991. Instead of a desert war to liberate Kuwait, combat would likely involve protracted siege warfare, chaotic street-to-street fighting in Baghdad, and Iraqi civil conflict. If that occurs, we fear our own nation and Iraq would both suffer casualties not witnessed since Vietnam. We fear the resulting carnage and humanitarian consequences would further devastate Iraqi society and inflame an already volatile Middle East, and increase terrorism against U.S. citizens........" |